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PROPOSAL TO REVERSE THE VIEW OF A CONFESSION:
FROM KEY EVIDENCE REQUIRING CORROBORATION
TO CORROBORATION FOR KEY EVIDENCE
Boaz Sangero*
Mordechai Halpert**
Both case law and legal literature have recognized that all, and not just clearly
statistical, evidence is probabilistic. Therefore, we have much to learn from the
laws of probability with regard to the evaluation of evidence in a criminal trial.
The present Article focuses on the confession. First, we review legal and psychologi-
cal literature and show that the probability of a false confession and, consequently,
a wrongful conviction, is far from insignificant. In light of this, we warn against
the cognitive illusion, stemming from the fallacy of the transposed conditional,
which is liable to mislead the trier of fact in evaluating the weight of a confession.
This illusion in evaluating the weight of a confession occurs when the trier offact
believes that, if there is only a low probability that an innocent person would false-
ly confess, then there is also only a low probability of innocence in each and every
case where a person does confess guilt. The surprising truth is that even if there is
only little doubt regarding the credibility of confessions in general, in some cases,
this raises considerable doubt regarding the certainty of a conviction. We demon-
strate this through the case of George Allen, who was convicted in 1983 of the rape
and murder of Mary Bell. This is an example of a case in which the fallacy reach-
es extreme proportions, since nothing connected the accused to the crime, apart
from his confession.
Following this, we turn to a Bayesian calculation of probability for evaluating the
weight of a confession. First, we discuss the standard of proof required for a crimi-
nal conviction. We show that the optimistic expectation of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Kansas v. Marsh regarding the rate of false convictions (0.027%) is incon-
sistent with Blackstone's famous approach, accepted by many judges, whereby it is
better for ten criminals to be acquitted than for one innocent to be convicted
(9.09% wrongful convictions). We then demonstrate the untenability of the opti-
mistic estimate that it is possible to convict with a relatively low probability of guilt
(approximately 91 %) without paying a very heavy price in wrongful convictions.
Considering this, we explain why we prefer the ratio proposed by Thomas Starkie,
whereby it is better for a hundred criminals to be acquitted than for one innocent to
be convicted. The probabilistic calculation that we perform based on this threshold
of 1:100 dictates a new and surprising conclusion that calls for a significant
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reversal in how we view the confession: a confession should only be treated as cor-
roboration of other solid evidence-if it exists-and not as key evidence for a
conviction. Furthermore, even if we suffice with Blackstone's familiar threshold of
1:10, the strength of the other evidence against the suspect, apart from the confes-
sion, must still be at least a balance of probabilities (51 %) in order to achieve
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the burden required for a conviction.
Given the real danger of convicting innocents, we call on law enforcement officials
to refrain from interrogating a person, with the aim of extracting a confession,
when there is no well-established suspicion against this person, and even when the
law allows for such an interrogation. Moreover, we call on legislatures to amend
the law so that such an interrogation would not be possible, and to set forth that a
confession is insufficient to constitute the sole, or key, evidence for a conviction,
but it can be used only as corroboration for other key evidence-if it exists.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Both case law and legal literature have recognized that all, not
just clearly statistical, evidence is probabilistic.' Given the disclo-
sure, in recent decades, of numerous cases worldwide, there is no
longer any reason to doubt that people sometimes confess to
crimes that they have not committed and are even convicted on
the basis of those confessions. In Parts II and III of this Article, we
review the legal and psychological literature regarding false confes-
sions and show that the probability of a false confession (and of a
wrongful conviction based on it) is far from insignificant. Follow-
1. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
2. See Boaz Sangero, Miranda Is Not Enough: A New Justiication for Demanding "Strng
Corrboration"to a Confession, 28 CARDozo L. REv. 2791 (2007).
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ing this, we examine what may be learned from probability theory
with regard to the weight of the confession (Parts IV-VIII).
In a different article, we have warned against the cognitive illu-
sion stemming from the fallacy of the transposed conditional in
evaluating the weight of forensic as well as other types of evidence,
when relying solely on this evidence for the purposes of a convic-
tion. In the legal context, this fallacy has been referred to as the
"prosecutor's fallacy."4 Despite the fact that statistical principles of
medical diagnosis lead medical practitioners to take precautions
against this fallacy, many still fall into its trap.5 The need to avoid
this fallacy has been identified in case law only in certain situations,
primarily with regard to paternity tests,6 the possibility of a random
DNA match in a criminal trial,' and drug tests in the workplace."
However, in general, and particularly with regard to non-scientific
evidence, courts are unaware of this fallacy. The significance of the
fallacy is that the trier of fact errs by substituting the probability of
the evidence given innocence (a probability that assumes what
actually needs to be proven)' for the transposed conditional prob-
ability-the probability of innocence given (and despite) the
evidence -which is the probability relevant to the legal decision.
In Bayesian language,"o in order to determine the likelihood of
guilt or innocence given evidence that may be erroneous, one
must take into consideration the prior odds of guilt-i.e., the
probability of guilt without the key evidence against the suspect.
3. Boaz Sangero & Mordechai Halpert, Why a Conviction Should Not Be Based on a Single
Piece of Evidence: A Proposal for Reform, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 43 (2007). Regarding the fallacy of
the transposed conditional, see Persi Diaconis & David Freedman, The Persistence of Cognitive
Illusions, 4 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 317, 333 (1981). An explanation of the fallacy of the trans-
posed conditional follows infra Part IV.
4. William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in
Criminal Tials: The Prosecutor's Fallacy and the Defense Attorney's Fallacy, 11 LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
167 (1987).
5. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Evidential Impact of Base Rates, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 153-54 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic &
Amos Tversky eds., 1982). Moreover, in a German study, half of all counselors surveyed mis-
takenly believed that a positive HIV test result meant a 100% certainty that a subject from a
low-risk group was a carrier. Most counselors mistakenly believed that a repeat HIV test ne-
gates all possibility of a false positive. Gerd Gigerenzer, Ulrich Hoffrage & Axel Ebert, AIDS
Counsellingfor Low-Risk Clients, 10 AIDS CARE 197, 207 (1998).
6. State v. Spann, 617 A.2d 247, 254 (N.J. 1993).
7. Brown v. Farwell, 525 F.3d 787, 795 (9th Cir. 2008).
8. Ishikawa v. Delta Airlines, 343 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003); Gonzalez v. Metro.
Transp. Auth., 174 F.3d 1016, 1023 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Darold T Barnum & John M.
Gleason, The Credibility of Drug Tests: A Multi-Stage Bayesian Analysis, 47 INDUS. & LAB. REL.
REv. 610 (1994).
9. See Spann, 617 A.2d at 252 ("[T]he trier of fact cannot convict a defendant of a
crime through a formula that assumes the defendant committed the crime.").
10. For an explanation of Bayes' Theorem, see infra Parts VI & VII.
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These prior odds derive from the remaining evidence in the case at
hand, including exculpatory evidence. The lower the prior odds,
the more extreme the cognitive illusion.
In the present Article, we focus on the confession. One possible
case in which the prior odds would be very low is when an interro-
gation is initiated as a result of some suspicion, and the suspect in-
indeed confesses. Later, it becomes clear that the original suspicion
was unfounded, so that apart from the confession, there is nothing
to link the accused to the criminal offense." Another example oc-
curs when the police take "a shot in the dark," interrogating a
person suspected of one crime with regard to a different offense,
without any objective suspicion linking this person to the other
crime.1 When the suspect confesses to the second offense, his con-
fession is the only significant piece of evidence against him. As we
will see shortly, in such cases, the cognitive illusion reaches ex-
treme proportions: when a conviction ensues, in most cases of this
type it will be a wrongful conviction.
In Parts V and VI we demonstrate this through the case of
George Allen, who was convicted in 1983 of the rape and murder
of Mary Bell in St. Louis.1 3 Allen was taken in for questioning by
mistake when he was stopped by police and was unable to produce
a photo ID in order to prove that he was not another individual
who was wanted in the murder. By the end of his interrogation he
had confessed to the crime and he was subsequently put on trial.
George Allen was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder,
without any possibility of parole for a period of fifty years, and an
additional forty-five years for rape and burglary. Had the danger of
the fallacy of the transposed conditional been seriously considered
in this case, it would have likely led to a determination that there
was a very high probability that George Allen was innocent.
In Parts VII and VIII, we go on to analyze the confession in cases
where the cognitive illusion is not as extreme. Current American
law allows for a conviction based solely on a confession, whereas
corroboration is required only to prove the actual occurrence of
the crime.14 In a previous article, one of the authors has proposed
that this is not sufficient and that there should be a statutory re-
11. In our opinion, such was the case of George Allen. See State v. Allen, 684 S.W.2d
417 (1984); infra Parts VI-VII; see also Geri L. Dreiling, Best Evidence, RIVERFRONT TIMESJuly
2, 2003, http://www.riverfronttimes.com/20034)7-02/news/best-evidence.
12. In our opinion, such was the case of David Allen Jones. See David AllenJones, THE
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://innocenceproject.org/Content/191.php (last visited Jan. 2,
2011).
13. See Allen, 684 S.W2d at 417; Dreiling, supra note 11.
14. See Sangero, supra note 2, at 2803-06.
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quirement for "strong corroboration"-i.e., independent evidence,
extraneous to the accused, that links him to the commission of the
offense.1 5 In the present Article, we will see that even this is not
enough.
We also discuss, in Part II, the standard of proof required for a
criminal conviction. First, we show that the optimistic expectations
of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the rate of false convictions
(0.027%) is inconsistent with Blackstone's famous and leading ap-
proach, whereby it is better for ten criminals to be acquitted than
for one innocent to be convicted (9.09% wrongful convictions).
From here, we demonstrate the untenability of the optimistic esti-
mate that it is possible to convict with a relatively low probability of
guilt, of approximately 91%, without paying a very heavy price in
wrongful convictions. We also show this under the assumption that
the probability of guilt derived from the evidence is not fixed and
for some defendants the inculpatory evidence is much more con-
vincing (e.g., 99%) than the required threshold (91%).
Considering this, we prefer the ratio proposed by Thomas Starkie,
whereby it is better for a hundred criminals to be acquitted than
for one innocent to be convicted. The probabilistic calculation that
we perform based on this threshold leads to a new and surprising
conclusion, which demands a significant reversal in how we view
the confession: not only is a confession, on its own, far from suffi-
cient for proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but it should
only be treated as corroboration of other solid evidence-if it ex-
ists-and not as key evidence for a conviction. Furthermore, even if
we suffice with Blackstone's familiar threshold of 1:10, the strength
of the other evidence against the suspect, apart from the confes-
sion, must still be at least a balance of probabilities (51%) in order
to establish a conviction.
In the Epilogue, given the real danger of convicting innocents,
we call on law enforcement officials to refrain from interrogating a
person, with the aim of extracting a confession, when there is no
well-established suspicion against this person, and even when the
law allows for such an interrogation. Moreover, we call on legisla-
tures to amend the law so that such an interrogation would not be
possible, and to set forth that a confession is unable to constitute
the sole, or key, evidence for a conviction, but may only be used as
corroboration for other key evidence-if it exists in the specific
case.
15. Id. at 2817-25. For another suggested resolution to the danger of using a false con-
fession as a basis of conviction, see Talia Fisher & Issachar Rosen-Zvi, The Confessional Penalty,
30 CARDOzo L. REV. 871 (2008).
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II. THE POSSIBILITY OF FALSE CONFESSIONS
At the outset, we should remember that a confession of guilt is,
in itself, puzzling. It is an act that is totally counter to a person's
own interest. A central assumption of some who believe that con-
fessions are almost always true is that a suspect has no reason to
deny having committed a crime when he knows that the police
have solid evidence indicating his guilt. However, in the type of
case that the present Article is concerned with-where there is no
significant evidence whatsoever against the suspect other than his
own confession (which he has usually retracted)-the suspect has
no such reason to confess. His confession is irrational and, there-
fore, also very suspicious.
In the past, many scholars have viewed a confession as the
"queen of evidence." In recent decades, this view has been chang-
ing, as numerous studies have indicated the phenomenon of false
confessions. Given the findings of the Innocence Project at the
Cardozo School of Law," this is no longer mere speculation. It is a
proven fact that many suspects have falsely confessed and have
been convicted on the basis of such confessions. In approximately
one quarter of these cases, the wrongful conviction was based on a
confession.'1 It should be noted that only in a small percentage of
cases in which a claim of wrongful conviction is raised is there suf-
ficient physical evidence to perform a post-conviction DNA test.
Accordingly, we may assume that those cases in which wrongful
convictions have been revealed through DNA testing only repre-
sent the tip of the iceberg.'9
16. See, e.g., Stephen C. Thaman, Miranda in Comparative Law, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 581,
581 (2001) ("Historically, confessions of guilt have been the 'best evidence in the whole
world' .... ).
17. See BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS
To EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000). This book,
by the founders of the Innocence Project, reports and analyzes over sixty of the first cases of
acquittal. For a more up-to-date picture, see THE INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Jan. 2, 2010). See also Karen Christian, "And
the DNA Shall Set You Free": Issues Surrounding Postconviction DNA Evidence and the Pursuit of
Innocence, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1195 (2001); David DeFoore, Postconviction DNA Testing: A Cry for
Justice from the Wrongly Convicted, 33 Thx. TECH L. REV. 491 (2002); Keith A. Findley, Learning
from Our Mistakes: A Criminal justice Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L.
REv. 333 (2002); Elizabeth V. LaFollette, State v. Hunt and Exculpatory DNA Evidence: When Is
a New Trial Warranted?, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1295 (1996).
18. See SCHECK, NEUFELD & DWYER, supra note 17, at app. 2, tbl. "Factors Leading to
Wrongful Convictions in 62 U.S. Cases"; Findley, supra note 17. For a study analyzing the first
two hundred acquittals of the Innocence Project, see Brandon L. Garrett, judging Innocence,
108 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (2008).
19. GIsLI H. GUDjONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A
HANDBOOK 174-78 (2003).
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The existence of a phenomenon of false confessions has also
been verified in the famous study by Bedau and Radelet.20 Forty-
nine out of 350 wrongful convictions analyzed were found to in-
volve false confessions. Moreover, in seventeen of those cases, false
confessions had been given voluntarily by interrogees, without any
illegitimate coercion by police interrogators.2 ' Therefore, it is not
enough to attribute false confessions to external factors; we must
address internal factors influencing the interrogee.
Another important study was conducted by Leo and Ofshe."
Their research contains findings regarding sixty instances of false
confession in the United States following the landmark decision
Miranda v. Arizona," where it was held that the police must inform
suspects of their constitutional right to remain silent, that if they
choose to waive this right anything they say may be used against
them in a court of law, and that they have a right to meet with a
defense attorney (private or court-appointed) prior to an interro-
gation and to demand the presence of the attorney during the in-
interrogation itself. Violation of a suspect's Miranda rights leads to
the inadmissibility of a confession as evidence at trial. Leo and
Ofshe have shown that even following the establishment of the Mi-
randa rules and a transition by the police from a coercive
interrogation to a "psychological interrogation," there is still a
phenomenon of false confessions (and convictions based on such
confessions) in the United States.
Research based on both the observation of interrogation vide-
otapes and surveys conducted among police interrogators
demonstrates that more than 80% of suspects waive their right to
silence.2 6 Moreover, in a lab experiment designed to simulate a po-
lice interrogation, it was found that 81% of the subjects who were
designated as "innocent" waived their right to remain silent as op-
posed to only 36% of those designated as "guilty."27 Kassin refers to
this as the innocence-confession paradox, since Miranda warnings
do not sufficiently protect those most in need of them-the
20. Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages ofJustice in Potentially Capital Cas-
es, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21 (1987).
21. Id. at 62-63.
22. Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations
of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998).
23. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
24. Id. at 492.
25. Leo & Ofshe, supra note 22, at 492.
26. Saul Kassin, The Psychology of Confessions, 4 ANN. REv. L. Soc. Sci. 193, 200 (2008).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 206.
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innocent."9 Innocent persons think that, since they have done no
wrong and have nothing to hide,30 interrogators will be persuaded
of their innocence,3 ' and therefore, they waive their right to re-
main silent, which exposes them to the risk of false confession. No-
Notably, people without a criminal past will be more inclined to
waive the right to silence than those with such a past.32
In psychological literature, three categories have been proposed
for classifying false confessions: voluntary, coerced-compliant, and
coerced-internalized. 3 The first category-voluntary false confes-
sions-includes those cases in which people come to the police at
their own initiative and incriminate themselves for something
that they did not do.3 This often occurs in high-profile cases.
Thus, for example, 200 people voluntarily confessed to the 1932
kidnapping of Charles Lindbergh's infant son, while over fifty
people confessed to the 1947 murder of Elizabeth Short." In
2006, John Mark Karr confessed to the unsolved and widely pub-
licized 1996 murder ofJonBendt Ramsey. There are various reasons
for this type of confession, including "a pathological need for atten-
tion or self-punishment; feelings of guilt or delusions; the perception
of tangible gain; or the desire to protect. . . someone else."38
The second category-coerced-compliant false confessions-
includes those confessions elicited by the pressure of an interroga-
tion. In such cases, someone will prefer to confess in order to
obtain short-term benefits, like the possibility to sleep, to be left
alone, or to be released. 9 An example of such a case occurred in
1989, when five youths confessed to the brutal rape and beating of
29. Id. at 207.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 200, 207.
32. Id. at 200; Richard A. Leo, Miranda's Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence
Game, 30 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 259 (1996). For a very interesting analysis, arguing that the right
to remain silent is desirable in order to increase the chance that triers of fact will believe the
innocent, thus allowing them to make a distinction between innocent persons (who would
usually choose to talk) and guilty persons (who would usually choose to remain silent), see
DanielJ. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analy-
sis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARv. L. REv. 430 (2000); Alex Stein, The Right to
Silence Helps the Innocent: A Response to Critics, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 1115 (2008).
33. SAUL KASSIN & LAWRENCE WRIGHTSMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRI-
AL PROCEDURE 77-78 (1985); Kassin, supra note 26, at 195-96.
34. Kassin, supra note 26, at 195.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id; see also Neal Karlinsky & Mary Kate Burke, Does Karr Believe He Did It? The Truth
in John Mark Karr's False Confession, ABC NEWS, Aug. 30, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/US/
LegalCenter/story?id=2372612&page=i.
38. Kassin, supra note 26, at 195.
39. Id.
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a female jogger in New York City's Central Park.40 They were only
released in 2002, after the actual rapist, Matias Reyes, voluntarily
confessed-demonstrating knowledge of the details of the as-
sault-and his confession was verified by a DNA test.4' After their
release, each of the five youths claimed that he had expected to go
home following the interrogation.
The third category-coerced-internalized false confessions-
includes those cases in which, during the course of an interrogation,
innocent persons become convinced that they are actually guilty.4 3
This belief is sometimes also accompanied by false memories. Thus,
for example, fourteen-year-old Michael Crowe confessed to the stab-
bing and murder of his sister after interrogators misled him into
thinking that they had physical evidence of his guilt. He truly be-
gan to believe that he had committed the crime. The accusations
against him were only dropped after investigators found stains of
the victim's blood on the clothing of a neighbor."
In a study of forty rape and murder convictions based on confes-
sions that, with the help of post-conviction DNA evidence, were
later revealed to be false, Garrett found that thirty-eight of the con-
fessions were not merely admissions like "I did it," but rather
statements full of detail and a precise description of the actual
commission of the offense. Garrett describes how, in many cases,
prosecutors argue in court that these are details that only the true
culprit could have known, and that they were not revealed to the
suspect by interrogators, either inadvertently or intentionally.1 As
an example, he discusses the case of Jeffrey Deskovic, who, based
on his confessions to the police, was convicted of the rape and
murder of a fifteen year-old classmate. In the trial at which he was
convicted, the prosecution argued that he had described three de-
tails from the scene of the murder unknown to the wider public. In
particular, he had described how he "'hit her in the back of the
head with a Gatoraid [sic] bottle that was lying on the path.'4" Po-
lice testified that, following this statement, they conducted a
40. Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, True Cimes, False Confessions: Why Do Innocent
People Confess to Cimes They Did Not Commit?, Sci. AM. MINDJune 2005, at 24, 24-26.
41. Id. at 26.
42. Kassin, supra note 26, at 195.
43. Id. at 195-96.
44. Id.




48. Id. at 1055 (quoting Trial Transcript at 1185, People v. Deskovic, No. 192-90 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 1990)).
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careful search of the crime scene the next day and found the cap
of a Gatorade bottle. 9 During closing arguments, in order to per-
suade the jury of the confession's credibility, the prosecutor
stressed that the Gatorade cap had only been found after the ac-
cused spoke of it.50
Since we know today that a DNA test conducted in 2006 yielded
a positive match to a different person-Steven Cunningham, a
convicted murderer who, following the DNA test, confessed to this
very same murder 5-it is clear that Deskovic's confession was "con-
taminated.",2 Thus, many of the thirty-eight false confessions in
Garrett's study-full of detail that, supposedly, only the true culprit
could have known-were also necessarily contaminated, despite
the fact that police testified that this was impossible. When
Deskovic was asked why he had confessed to something that he did
not do, he answered: "'Believing in the criminal justice system and
being fearful for myself, I told them what they wanted to hear.' 53
Even permissible methods of interrogation entail risk factors.
One such risk factor is detention itself and the length of the inter-
rogation. The longer the interrogation, the greater the risk of a
false confession." A second risk factor is the presentation of con-
cocted evidence to the interrogee, supposedly indicating his guilt,
such as a fingerprint match. Such fabricated evidence constitutes a
major risk factor for false confessions.5 5 Actual cases and psycholo-
gy experiments bore this out.5 6 When an interrogee is confronted
with forensic evidence that supposedly proves his guilt, such as a
fingerprint match, there are three dangers: (1) the interrogee is
liable to become convinced that he indeed committed the crime
(especially if he was under the influence of alcohol or drugs during
the incident and does not remember what actually happened) ;57
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Deskovic, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content _Deskovic.php (last visited Jan. 2, 2011).
52. Garrett, supra note 45, at 1056.
53. Kassin, supra note 26, at 206; Femanda Santos, DNA Testing Frees Man Imprisoned for
Half His Life, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 21, 2006, at BI, B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/09/21/world/americas/21iht-prison.2892402.html.
54. Garrett, supra note 45, at 1095; Kassin, supra note 26, at 201-02; see also Leo & Of-
she, supra note 22.
55. Garrett, supra note 45, at 1097-99; Kassin, supra note 26, at 201-02.
56. Kassin, supra note 26, at 202-03.
57. Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REv. 425,
462 (1996). This might happen even without the influence of alcohol or drugs. See DAVID
WOLCHOVER & HEATON ARMSTRONG, ON CONFESSION EVIDENCE 95 (1996); Welsh S. White,
False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 105, 128 (1997).
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(2) the interrogee becomes convinced that all claims of innocence
will be of no avail;5 8 (3) the interrogee gets caught up in a web of
lies that reinforces the erroneous assumption that he is guilty. Ap-
parently, given these dangers, the English Court of Appeals has
held that a suspect cannot be actively misled, although there is no
obligation to disclose all of the investigative material against him.59
A third risk factor is that of "minimization," which is when an in-
terrogator minimizes the severity of the offense and ostensibly
empathizes with the interrogee, characterizing the act as acci-
dental, spontaneous, or otherwise justifiable by external factors.6
One experiment attempting to simulate realistic conditions
demonstrated the power of certain interrogation tactics to increase
the number of false confessions. Students participating in this ex-
periment were each paired with a "confederate" and then
instructed to solve some problems of logic individually and some
problems jointly.6 2 In what was defined as the "guilty condition,"
the confederate asked his or her partner for help in solving a prob-
lem that was supposed to be solved individually, thus causing
several participants to violate the rules of the experiment. In the
"innocent condition," the confederate did not make such a re-
quest, so that no participant in this group violated this rule. 3 In the
end, both "innocent" and "guilty" participants were accused of
violating the rules of the experiment, an act later characterized as
"cheating." They were then "interrogated" and asked to sign a con-
fession." When no interrogation technique was employed, only 6%
of the innocent participants confessed, compared to 46% of the
guilty.65 When the minimization technique was applied, 18% of the
innocent confessed, as opposed to 81% of the guilty." When the
deal technique (an offer of leniency) was used, 14% of the inno-
cent confessed, compared to 72% of the guilty.67 A combination of
both interrogation methods led to a confession rate of 43%
among the innocent and 87% among the guilty.6 Thus, the use of
58. See R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 43 (Can.).
59. See Case and Comment, Evidence/Jury: R. v. Imran and Hussain, 1997 CRIM. L. REV.
754.
60. GUDJONSSON, supra note 19, at 21.
61. Melissa B. Russano, Christian A. Meissner, Fadia M. Narchet & Saul M. Kassin, In-
vestigating True and False Confessions Within a Novel Experimental Paradigm, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI.
481 (2005).
62. Id. at 482.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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interrogation techniques indeed raises the probability that a crim-
inal will confess (by double); however, there is a much more
significant increase (sevenfold) in the possibility that an innocent
person will confess.
There is a fundamental mistake that, in our view, underlies the
tactics of police interrogations. As we shall see below, the appropri-
ate weight of confessions as proof of guilt should be relatively low,
both because false confessions are not rare and because fact find-
ers are unable to distinguish between true confessions and false
confessions. However, a confession is still erroneously conceived as
very strong evidence, and therefore police interrogators invest
much pain in extracting confessions. But here is the mistake: the
more energy that is invested in extracting a confession through the
use of doubtful tactics, such as jailhouse snitches or lying about
incriminating evidence, the lower the reliability of the confession.
Furthermore, the pains that interrogators take to extract confes-
sions may not only bring about a false confession but also prevent
the fact finders from recognizing a false confession. This would be
the case, for example, when interrogators contaminate a confes-
sion by feeding the interrogee with details, knowledge of which
would strengthen the reliability of the confession in court.
Indirect indications of the rate of false confessions were also ob-
tained in a survey of 631 police interrogators in the United States
and Canada. In this survey, interrogators expressed a belief that
confessions are elicited from 68% of all suspects and that 4.78% of
these confessions are elicited from innocent persons." Another
study in Iceland revealed that 12% of the prisoners surveyed said
that they had confessed to crimes that they did not commit.7 0
The personality of the interrogee also entails risk factors for
false confessions. Some interrogees are more vulnerable to exter-
nal pressure than others and, therefore, are also at a higher risk of
false confession. Persons with a tendency for compliance in social
situations are especially vulnerable. This is a result of their eager-
ness to please others and to avoid confrontation, particularly with
regard to authority figures. Moreover, persons with high levels of
anxiety, fear, depression, delusions, or other psychological disor-
ders are also at an increased risk.
69. See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Po-
lice Practices and Beliefs, 31 LAW & Hum. BEHAV. 381, 392, 397 (2007).
70. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 19, at 176.
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Juveniles have a heightened risk of confessing to something that
they have not done." Persons who are intellectually disabled or
75mentally retarded are also in a high-risk group.
Research and reality both indicate that the reasons for false con-
fessions are extremely diverse, and some are even bizarre."
People have falsely confessed in order to avoid the burden of trial
for a minor offense, to cover up for a friend, or to ensure that their
families are taken care of by organized crime. Some have confessed
with the hope that, in doing so, their name would not appear in
the newspapers. Some have confessed in order to get quickly to a
university exam or an important chess match. Some confessions
are the result of mental illness. Some are given out of a fear of the
death penalty. One person confessed in order to avoid being ex-
posed as an adulterer. Some people have confessed because they
were too drunk to remember what happened. One person con-
fessed to a robbery that he did not commit to avoid being sent as a
soldier to Northern Ireland. Another person confessed as a joke.
There was even one individual who confessed in order to impress
his girlfriend and, while in prison, confessed to another murder
that he did not commit-only in order to prove that a wrongful
conviction was possible-and he succeeded! Reality is stranger
than fiction. 8
Another major cause of false confessions is the suspect's mistak-
en belief that, having already provided one confession, elicited by
interrogators through illegitimate means, any further confessions
that he gives are meaningless. Sometimes the suspect is misled into
believing this and further, ostensibly legitimate confessions are ob-
tained without the use of illicit means. 9 Some have even pled guilty
in court and were subsequently found to be innocent.80
In conclusion, today we know that false confessions are not rare
and that many of them reach courts. Can the legal system ade-
quately cope with false confessions?
74. Id. at 203-05.
75. See id. at 206.
76. Arye Rattner, Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and the Criminaljustice Sys-
tem, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 283 (1988).
77. Sangero, supra note 2, at 2799-800; see also ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUS-
TICE, REPORT 57 (1993); Bedau & Radelet, supra note 20, at 58-63; Arye Rattner, Convicting
the Innocent: When justice Goes Wrong (1983) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio
State University) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
78. Sangero, supra note 2, at 2799-800.
79. Peter Mirfield, Successive Confessions and the Poisonous Tree, 1996 CRIM. L. REv. 554.
80. Nine out of the first 200 persons released as a result of the Innocence Project pled
guilty in court and did not just confess during the interrogation. See Garrett, supra note 18,
at 74 & n.71. Seven of them confessed to murder, and two confessed to rape.
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III. FROM A FALSE CONFESSION TO A WRONGFUL CONVICTION
In Escobedo v. Illinois, Justice Goldberg wrote:
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern,
that a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to de-
pend on the "confession" will, in the long run, be less reliable
and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on
extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful in-
vestigation.m
American law offers three central mechanisms to cope with false
confessions: (1) the familiar Miranda rules; (2) the requirement of
corroboration; and (3) the ability of the courts to distinguish be-
tween true and false confessions. Indeed, the Miranda rules
seriously address the problem of involuntary confessions.2 The Mi-
randa rules are based on the assumption that a confession during a
custodial interrogation is inherently involuntary, which dictates a
need for procedural safeguards that include the requirement to
inform the suspect of his right to remain silent, that anything he
says may be used against him, and of his right to consult with an
attorney. However, despite these rules, false confessions remain a
significant phenomenon in the United States, and innocent per-
813
sons are still convicted on the basis of such confessions. First, a
large number of interrogees validly waive their Miranda rights.'
Second, the use of trickery, and even deceit, by police interrogators
is not prohibited and does not render a confession inadmissible."'
Finally, as we will show, American law does not seriously address the
danger of confessions that, although voluntary, are still false.86
On its face, American law provides a rule that adequately ad-
dresses the fear that a confession--even if voluntary-might be
false. This rule demands additional corroborative evidence at trial
81. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964) (footnotes omitted).
82. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
83. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 22.
84. Mandy DeFilippo, You Have the Right to Better Safeguards: Looking Beyond Miranda in
the New Millennium, 34J. MARSHALL L. REv. 637, 639-40 (2001); Amanda L. Prebble, Manip-
ulated by Miranda: A Critical Analysis of Bright Lines and Voluntary Confessions under United
States v. Dickerson, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 555,578-79 (2000).
85. See Prebble, supra note 84, at 583; see also Richard A. Leo, From Coercion to Deception:
The Changing Nature of Police Interrogation in America, 18 CRIME L. & Soc. CHANGE 35 (1992);
White, supra note 57.
86. In effect, the focus of American case law on the question as to whether the confes-
sion was voluntary, which is answered affirmatively as long as the Miranda rules have been
followed, has led to an abandonment of the question of the truth of the confession. See Rog-
ers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961); see also Garrett, supra note 45, at 1092-94.
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in order to convict someone based on a confession. Such a rule has
been established in many American jurisdictions through both leg-
islation and case law.87
The corroboration requirement as traditionally formulated in
American law requires some evidence in addition to the confession
that tends to establish the corpus delicti. It does not demand that
such evidence proves the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt-
only "slight" corroborative evidence is required.88
The corpus delicti is literally defined as "the body of the crime." 9
The American corroboration requirement pertains solely to the
commission of the offense itself, and not to the identity of the per-
petrator. In a criminal trial, the prosecution must prove three main
elements: (1) the injury or harm constituting the crime; (2) the
criminal nature of this injury or harm; and (3) that this injury or
harm was inflicted by the defendant.90 The definition of the corpus
delicti only includes the first and second elements. Therefore, the
corroborative evidence does not necessarily need to prove that the
defendant was the guilty party.
In fact, a requirement for evidence as to the actual commission
of the offense-in addition to the confession itself-might refute
some false confessions and thus prevent wrongful convictions. It
would also save the legal system the embarrassment caused when a
person is convicted and evidence later reveals that no crime was
even committed-such as when a person is convicted of murder
and the "victim" turns up alive. However, this type of situation rep-
resents only a small fraction of wrongful convictions. In most cases,
the police have solid evidence of a crime, and the main question is
whether or not a suspect who confesses is the actual perpetrator, a
question that the existing corroboration requirement fails to ad-
dress.
It is meaningless to ask whether or not a crime was actually
committed if this question is asked with regard to a person who was
not even involved. When the wrong person is in custody to start,
then proof that the offense was committed says nothing about this
individual's involvement or guilt."
87. See, e.g., I CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 212 (John W.
Strong ed., 5th ed., Student ed. 1999).




92. To complete the picture, it should also be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has
provided an alternative approach to the corroboration requirement whereby, instead of
evidence that supports the corpus delicti, it is necessary to present "substantial independent
evidence which would tend to establish the trustworthiness of the statement." Opper v.
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In previous articles, we have proposed, as a solution, to establish
a statutory requirement of "strong corroboration" as a necessary
condition for convicting a person on the basis of a confession:
strong, independent corroboration (with regard to the defendant)
supporting the conclusion that the defendant is the one who
committed the crime. In the present Article, we will see that even
this would not be enough to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, given the low weight of the confession.
Supposedly-if they were capable of distinguishing between true
and false confessions-we might be able to assume that police in-
vestigators, prosecutors, judges, and juries would screen out false
confessions, and that convictions would only be based on genuine
confessions. However, research shows that, contrary to the belief of
many, police investigators, prosecutors, judges, juries-in effect, all
of us-are incapable of distinguishing between true and false con-
fessions. For instance, research by Leo and Ofshe demonstrates
that 73% of the false confessions that proceeded to trial in their
study led to wrongful convictions.5 Both juries and judges failed
to identify these false confessions. Furthermore, in a more com-
prehensive study conducted by Drizin and Leo, 86% of the false
confessions that went to trial in their study led to wrongful con-
victions.
Finally we want to suggest a focused response to the question,
"Why do courts not identify false confessions?" Our explanation is
complex: First, despite the latest studies pointing to the widespread
phenomenon of false confessions and of wrongful convictions based
on them, many judges and many juries still err in thinking that a
person is not expected to confess to a crime he or she did not com-
mit; therefore, if someone does confess to a crime, the chances that
this person did commit it are very high, to the extent that the pos-
United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954). This requirement is even weaker, 1 McCoRMICK, Supra
note 87, at 215-16, which, in our opinion, makes it even less satisfactory. Regarding other
legal systems, in particular, the English and Israeli systems, see Sangero, supra note 2, at
Parts 111.B & III.C.
93. Sangero, supra note 2, at 2818-26; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 3, at 86-87.
94. See, e.g, Saul M. Kassin et al., "I'd Know a False Confession if I Saw One": A Comparative
Study of College Students and Police Investigators, 29 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 211 (2005). For refer-
ences to additional studies with similar results, see id. at 212, 222.
95. See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 22, at 482.
96. Richard A. Leo & Deborah Davis, From False Confession to Wrongful Conviction: Seven
Psychological Processes, 32J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 9, 19-20 (2010).
97. Stephen A. Drizin & Richard Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA
World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 993 (2004).
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sibility of a false confession may even be disregarded, indeed al-
most avoided."
Second, the literature supports the fact that police investigators,
prosecutors, and judges do not know how to distinguish between a
true confession and a false one.m
Third, studies show that confessions are contaminated (apparently
by police investigators, sometimes consciously and at other times
without being aware of having done so) by the details at the crime
scene, which constitute, as it were, "inside information" and which
are not made public, so that only the person who is connected to the
crime is likely to know them. "0 This contamination makes it difficult,
if not impossible, for judges and juries to identify a false confession.
Fourth, it seems that not only police investigators and prosecu-
tors, but even judges and juries, are frequently captive of the
distorted conception of the suspect's guilt, according to which the
suspect is assumed to be guilty and evidence of his guilt may be
sought; all the more so, an accused person is assumed to be guilty.o
Fifth, under the influence of this conception, the correct de-
tails-especially "inside information" -which are integrated into
the accused's confession are interpreted as supporting the conclu-
sion that the confession is true (notwithstanding the possibility of
its contamination, of which there is insufficient awareness); but
regarding mistaken details integrated into a confession or the in-
vestigation protocol, the tendency is to minimize their value or
even to avoid them altogether.102
Sixth, whereas decisive weight is attributed to a confession that
leads to a conviction, even when it is the only proof of the guilt of
the accused, no significance of any kind is generally attributed to
denials of having perpetrated the crime-during both the police
interrogation and the court procedure-whether these denials
preceded the confession or came after it or whether they existed
throughout the process. 03
Seventh, even when the interrogee tells of other crimes, some
admissions of which are unequivocally found to be false confes-
sions, there is still a tendency to select the confession of a crime for
98. Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications, 37 J. Amt.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 332, 341 (2009).
99. See Kassin et al., supra note 94 and accompanying text.
100. Garrett, supra note 45, at 1090-92.
101. Leo, supra note 98, at 332, 341.
102. See Garrett, supra note 45, at 1088.
103. Akos Farkas & Erika R6th, The Constitutional Limits of the Efficiency of CriminalJustice,
37 ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 139, 145 (1995-96).
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which no proof exists that he had not committed it and to use it
against him to gain a conviction104
Eighth, since the selection of the confession introduced in court
is made from among several confessions of different crimes, and
since this selection consists only of incriminating statements while
denials are ignored, and since the selection comprises the details
that accord with the crime scene and those that do not fit are dis-
missed, the chances that the court would be able to identify the
false confession are even smaller.
Ninth, the law-enforcement system considers itself highly redun-
dant.os The expectation is that when one unit fails (for instance,
the investigators force a false confession from a suspect), other
units will give it backing (for example, the district prosecutor, who
will identify that they are dealing with a false confession, or the
trier of fact or the court of appeals). Rather, these units are de-
pendent on one another, with one influencing the other. When
one unit collapses, the back-up units also fail with it."o6 In the con-
text of confessions, police investigators tend to rely on the
prosecutors and on the judges, who follow them, to filter out the
errors (false confessions that the interrogators extracted). The
prosecutors tend to rely both on the police investigators, who car-
ried out their work before the former (and with whom they have
permanent working ties), and on the judges, who come after them
(for they are the judges), to prevent wrongful convictions. The
judges, on the other hand, who have a heavy workload, tend to rely
on the law-enforcement people-the police investigators and the
prosecutors-assuming they did their work faithfully and brought
the guilty, and not the innocent, to trial. Similarly, appeals judges
tend to rely on lower-court judges. Thus, from the moment critical
errors are committed (the innocent targeted, a confession forced
or contaminated'o'), all these dependent systems collapse, leading
in the final analysis to a wrongful conviction.
In conclusion, false confession is a significant phenomenon and,
when it occurs, in most cases it leads to a wrongful conviction.
Therefore, probability theory should be used to properly evaluate
the weight of the confession.
104. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 45, at 1088-90.
105. William C. Thompson, Beyond Bad Apples: Analyzing the Role of Forensic Science in
Wrongful Convictions, 37 Sw. U. L. REv. 1027, 1032 (2008).
106. See id. at 1033-49 (demonstrating these cross-failures in the wrongful conviction of
Josiah Sutton).
107. Leo, supra note 98, at 334-38.
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IV. THE FALLACY OF THE TRANSPOSED CONDITIONAL
The fallacy of the transposed conditional relates to conditional
probabilities. It occurs when the probability of Event A, given
Event B, is substituted with the probability of Event B, given Event
A. These transposed conditional probabilities could be different,
by even several orders of magnitude. The larger the difference, the
more extreme the cognitive illusion stemming from the fallacy."o
Following are several examples.
A. Medical Diagnosis'"
A manufacturer (correctly) reports that a home kit for HIV test-
ing is very precise and that the probability of a false positive is only
0.1%. That is to say, if a thousand healthy people were tested with
this kit, only one of them would yield a false positive (erroneously
indicating an HIV carrier). Mr. Smith is tested with this kit and the
result is positive. The belief that there is a 99.9% probability that
Mr. Smith is an HIV carrier, and only a 0.1% probability that he is
not a carrier, is a powerful cognitive illusion deriving from the fal-
lacy of the transposed conditional. The truth is that the probability
that Mr. Smith is an HlV carrier also depends on the prevalence of
the HIV virus within the population to which he belongs (the "base
rate"). If Mr. Smith belongs to a low-risk group (he has not re-
ceived a blood transfusion, is not an intravenous drug user, and
does not perform unprotected sex), in which the incidence of the
HIV virus is only one out of ten thousand cases, and if the proba-
bility of a false negative is insignificant,o then the probability that
he is a carrier is only about 9% (as opposed to 99.9%), while the
probability that he is not a carrier is 91% (as opposed to 0.1%).
This is so because, if 10,000 members of Mr. Smith's low-risk group
are tested, eleven tests would yield a positive result: one person
who is indeed, unfortunately, an HIV carrier; and ten additional
cases of testing error (1 out of 1000; 10 out of 9999). From among
the eleven, only one person is actually an HIV carrier. Therefore,
the probability that Mr. Smith is a carrier is only 1/11, about 9%,
or, to put more optimistically: approximately a 91% probability
108. See Diaconis & Freedman, supra note 3; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 3, at 47-56.
For an example in a legal context, see Thompson & Schumann, supra note 4, at 170.
109. For an example regarding medical diagnosis, see Tversky & Kahneman, supra note
5. See also Sangero & Halpert, supra note 3, at 47-50.
110. The probability of a false negative is the probability that the test will erroneously
indicate that the person tested is not a carrier when he is indeed a carrier.
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that he is not an HIV carrier. This is an example of an extreme illu-
sion, whereby a (correct) probability of 9% is expected to be a
(mistaken) probability of 99.9%."'
B. Urine Tests in the Workplace for Detecting Drugs"'
Imagine that random testing of flight crews reveals that a partic-
ular stewardess used heroin. Let us assume that the probability of
obtaining a false positive in this type of test is 1%, i.e., if one hun-
dred people who have not used heroin were tested, one person
would, on average, falsely test positive for heroin use. The fallacy of
the transposed conditional leads to the belief that, given the posi-
tive test result, the probability that said stewardess used heroin is
99%, while the probability that she did not used the drug is only
1%. This is a mistake. The correct probability depends on the re-
maining evidence against the stewardess. According to a medical
model, for example, given an incidence of heroin use of one user
out of a thousand employees at said workplace, proximate to the
time of the testing, and given that the probability of a false nega-
tive is zero, then, despite the positive result, there is a probability of
91% that said stewardess did not use heroin."3
C. The Probability of a Random DNA Match
Let us assume that the probability of a random match between a
DNA sample of the actual perpetrator taken from the crime scene
and a DNA sample taken from an innocent suspect is 1/10,000.
The belief that the probability of innocence for a given suspect
whose DNA matches the DNA found at the scene of the crime is
111. See Sangero & Halpert, supra note 3, at 47-50; Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 5.
112. See Ishikawa v. Delta Airlines, 343 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2003); Gonzalez v. Met-
ro. Transp. Auth., 174 F.3d 1016, 1023 (9th Cir. 1999); Barnum & Gleason, supra note 8.
113. In a case involving drug testing in the workplace, a federal court held:
The substantive issue in this litigation was whether LabOne negligently tested and re-
ported on Ishikawa's urine. Some testing defects are subtle, like the Bayes' Theorem
problem we discussed in Gonzalez v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority. The Bayes'
Theorem problem is that if a test gives false positives 1% of the time, and the tested
population has genuinely "dirty" urine in one case out of ten, then out of a thousand
tests, 100 of the "positive" reports will be true and ten false; but if the tested popula-
tion has genuinely "dirty" urine in only one case out of a thousand, then the very
same test performed with the very same care will yield ten false positives for every
true positive.
Ishikawa, 343 F.3d at 1131 (foomotes omitted).
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also only 1/10,000 is an excellent example of the fallacy of the
transposed conditional."4 Remember, a defendant's innocence also
depends on the remaining evidence against him. If we assume that
the offense was committed in a city with a population of one mil-
lion people, then, on average, there are one hundred persons in this
city with such a genetic profile. Without any other evidence against
the suspect, and assuming that one of the city's residents is the per-
petrator and that each of these one hundred people are suspect to
the same extent, then the probability of the suspect's guilt is only
about 1% and the probability of his innocence is about 99%.
D. Discussion
There is an intuitive explanation for these surprising results. In
each of the above examples, we have tried to uncover a rare phe-
nomenon by means of a test: the HIV test attempts to identify one
carrier from among ten thousand people who are not carriers; the
drug test tries to identify one heroin user from among ten thou-
sand non-users; and the DNA test attempts to identify one offender
who has committed the crime from among all of a city's residents.
Thus, for instance, in the drug test example, the incidence of hero-
in use among flight crews is one in a thousand. The fallacy occurs
when one ignores this fact regarding the frequency of heroin use.
However, if 1000 employees are tested for heroin, then 11 positive
results would be obtained, according to the following breakdown:
one positive result would be obtained from a person who is actually
a heroin user and ten additional positive results would be obtained
as a result of testing error (one error for every 100 "clean" people
means approximately 10 errors for 999 "clean" people). Thus,
from among the 11 positive results, only one would be correct.
Therefore, the probability that a person who has tested positive is
indeed a heroin user is 1/11, only about 9%, while the probability
that this same employee is "clean" (despite the positive result of
the test) is 91%. The lower the incidence of heroin use that is ig-
nored, the more extreme the cognitive illusion. If these were flight
crews with a higher incidence of heroin use, for example, one out
of ten persons, then the cognitive illusion would be much less. A
simple calculation would show that, in this case, for every one
hundred true positives, there would only be nine false positives. 1 5
114. Brown v. Farwell, 525 F.3d 787, 795 (9th Cir. 2008).
115. To explain briefly: If we assume a very high incidence of heroin use of one in ten
(i.e., 100 out of 1000 employees are heroin users while 900 are not), then.when we test the
100 employees who are heroin users, we should get 100 positive results (assuming that there
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These surprising results may also be explained with the aid of
conditional probabilities. We shall demonstrate this with regard to
the probability of a random DNA match. A probability of 1/10,000
for a DNA match is a conditional probability. That is to say, it is the
probability of a match between a DNA sample of the unknown
perpetrator, found at the scene of the crime, and a DNA sample
taken from the suspect, given that the suspect is innocent. This proba-
bility assumes what actually needs to be proven (innocence or
guilt) and, therefore, should not be confused with the probability
of innocence. What should be of more interest to the court is the
probability of the transposed conditional: the probability of inno-
cence given a match (and despite its existence)." In the aforesaid
example, we have shown that there are 100 people in this city with
the same genetic profile. Therefore, the probability that the sus-
pect is actually the one who committed the crime, given the DNA
match, is only 1%. Consequently, the probability of innocence giv-
en (and despite) the match is 99%. In this case, the fallacy of the
transposed conditional is reflected in the treatment of the proba-
bility of a match, given innocence (1/10,000 = 0.1%), which
assumes what actually needs to be proven, as if it is the probability
of innocence, given a match (which, in fact, is about 99%). In the
same manner, regarding the example of an HIV test, the fallacy
occurs when the probability of a positive test result, given that a
person is not a carrier (0.1%), is substituted for the probability that
a person is not a carrier, given (and despite) the positive test result
(which is, in fact, 91% and not 0.1%). In the case of the drug test,
the fallacy is in the substitution of the probability of obtaining a
positive test result, given that the person did not use heroin (1%),
for the probability that the person did not use heroin, given (and
despite) the positive result (91%).
As these examples demonstrate, conditional probabilities could
be completely different, even by several orders of magnitude. The
relationship between two transposed conditional probabilities is
provided by Bayes' Theorem. This relationship requires knowledge
of the prior odds of the events in question. In Part VII, we will ex-
plain Bayes' Theorem and use it for the purpose of evaluating the
is no false negative). And when we test the 900 employees who do not use heroin, we should
get 9 false positives (one false positive in every 100 tests would yield, on average, 9 errors for
900 employees). Consequently, we should get 109 positive results, only 9 of which are false.
Therefore, the probability that said person (who has tested positive) has indeed used heroin
is 100/109, or 91%, while the probability that this person has not used heroin is 9%.
116. The probability of innocence given a match and the probability of guilt given a
match adds up to 1.
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proper weight of the confession. First, however, we will give an ex-
ample of the fallacy of the transposed conditional in an actual case.
V. GEORGE ALLEN AS A TEST CASE
George Allen was convicted in 1983 for the rape and murder of
Mary Bell.1 17 The victim was a thirty-one year-old freelance court
reporter who lived with her boyfriend in the LaSalle Park area of
St. Louis. On the morning of February 4, 1982, following a two-day
snowstorm, Mary Bell's boyfriend left for work at about 9:00 a.m.
At around 10:00 a.m., her neighbor heard "angry male and female
voices" and the sounds of a woman crying from Bell's apartment."
That lasted for about ten minutes."9 At around 10:30 a.m., the
neighbor heard the sound of someone knocking on a door.o2 0 Una-
ble to determine whether it was Bell's front door or her own, the
neighbor opened her door and saw a woman walking on the side-
walk after having left Bell's adjoining porch. 2 ' This woman turned
out to be Pamela Richardson, a colleague of Bell's.122 Richardson
had spoken with Bell on the phone between around 10:00 a.m. and
10:15 a.m.12 3 Bell interrupted the conversation briefly and, when
she returned to the phone again, she explained that she had been
in the middle of a shower and had to put on a robe.24 Bell then
agreed to Richardson's suggestion that she pick her up at home.
When Richardson arrived at Bell's apartment, she knocked on the
door several times without getting any answer.12 5 She later reported
that she heard "muffled bumping sounds" coming from inside. 2 6
According to Richardson, she called out to Bell, but still got no an-
swer.'2 1 She even tried to reach Bell later on in the day, by phone,
without any success.2
Bell's boyfriend also unsuccessfully tried reaching her by phone
on the same day, and when he returned home, at 6:00 p.m., he
117. State v. Allen, 684 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
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found her body.'" Seminal fluid was found on Bell's robe, on her
pants and on a chair.'30 The police concluded that she had been
raped and sodomized prior to her murder."'
Nothing was turned up during a six-week investigation. The po-
lice were looking for a convicted sex offender named Kirk Eaton,
who had been seen in Bell's neighborhood prior to the murder.'32
On March 14, 1982, about six weeks after the crime, George Allen
was walking about nine blocks away from Bell's apartment33 when
he was stopped by two patrolmen. Allen told them that he lived in
University City.'34 However, since he did not have a photo ID, he
was asked to come to the police station in order to verify his identi-
ty. After it was established that Allen "was not the man wanted for
questioning in Mary Bell's murder, [he] was released."3 5
According to the prosecution, before leaving the police station,
Allen made incriminating statements that led to his interrogation
and, eventually, his confession to the rape and murder of Mary
Bell.'36 Based solely on his confession, Allen was charged without
any other evidence linking him to the crime.
Allen's place of residence, University City, was about ten miles
away from Mary Bell's apartment at 1014b Marion Street in St.
Louis.'37 Allen's mother, his sister and sister's boyfriend testified, on
his behalf, that on the morning of the murder he was at home in
University City, where the streets were snowed in.'38 At his first trial,
Allen's defense "attack[ed] the probity of the boyfriend's testimony
and accuse [d] him [of being] the more likely candidate to have
had the opportunity and access to kill Mary Bell, thereby ham-
stringing rebuttal evidence by the state."'39 The jury at Allen's first
trial was unable to reach a verdict, and a new trial was scheduled.
At the second trial, the police brought alibi witnesses in order to
show that Bell's boyfriend could not have been the murderer.o
This time, the jury found Allen guilty of capital murder, rape, sod-
129. State v. Allen, 684 S.W2d 417, 419-20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
130. Id.
131. See id. at 424.
132. Id. at 421.
133. See id. at 419-20.
134. Id. at 421.
135. Id. at 420.
136. See id.
137. Dreiling, supra note 11. This distance is more or less correct when checked against
a map.
138. Id.
139. Allen, 684 S.W2d at 422.
140. Id.
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omy, and burglary, sentencing him to life imprisonment, without
the possibility of parole for a period of fifty years.4
On appeal, the defense argued several points, all of which were
rejected. One argument was that Allen's confession should have
been excluded in response to his motion to suppress and timely
trial objections, on the argument that the initial warrantless arrest,
resulting in his subsequent confession, was not based on probable
cause. The defense also claimed that his confession was involun-
tary.14 2 The latter argument was rejected for the following reasons:
Allen resembled two persons suspected in the murder of Mary Bell,
and he had no photo ID. He was wandering around an area close
to the scene of the murder. Thus, the court found that Allen's ini-
tial arrest was reasonable within the context of the Fourth
Amendment of the Constitution and, therefore, his confession was
not the forbidden fruit of an illegal seizure.14 3 Moreover, the court
rejected the claim of an involuntary confession, since Allen was
"advised of his Miranda rights upon his initial arrest, prior to his
questioning by the sex crimes officer investigating the rape[], and
prior to [his] interrogation by the homicide detective at depart-
ment headquarters."4 4 It was further held that Allen had not been
subjected to any illegal pressure such as physical force, threats, or
other prohibited coercive tactics. 4 5
In addition, the court rejected the argument that Allen's in-
dictment was based entirely on the confession without any other
evidence linking him to the crime.'4 6 The judges held that evidence
independent of the confession established the corpus delicti of the
offense.'4 ' The seminal fluid and anal lacerations proved that the
victim had been raped and sodomized. The inconsistencies in Al-
len's confession regarding the details of the crime were found to
not be dispositive."'4 This was because certain aspects of the confes-
sion were consistent with the evidence. The prosecution argued
that the police did not know that Richardson had called out Bell's
name when she knocked at the door until Allen provided this de-
tail;'4 9 and that only following his confession did they question
141. Id. at 419. This was the sentence for the charge of murder. In addition he was sen-
tenced to three consecutive fifteen year terms for the remaining counts. Id.
142. Id. at 420.
143. Id. at 421.
144. Id. at 422.
145. Id.
146. See id. at 423-24.
147. Id. at 424.
148. Id.
149. See id. Although, it should be noted that during his interrogation, Allen referred to
her as Sherry, and not Mary: "Ah, no, Sherry or somethin' like Sherry. Somethin'-I don't
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Richardson about this fact, who confirmed it."50 The prosecution
also argued that, in his confession, Allen said that he heard the
neighbor open and close the window. However, following the inci-
dent, the neighbor was very afraid to discuss the case with the
police. She told investigators that she knew nothing. She also
moved to another apartment. Only after Allen was apprehended
did she tell the police what she knew.'51
If Allen's confession was a false confession, then a very likely ex-
planation is that police interrogators misled him into believing that
they had fingerprints incriminating him:...
Q. [a question] George, I can't understand you. You re-
member so much, so many of the little details as I'm askin'
you questions. You remember about the big bust she had, and
about her waist and about this-
A. [an answer] I'm rememberin' it 'cause you got the evi-
dence. I don't-
Q. I showed you-
A. -remember nothin'.
Q. You mentioned the knife. You mentioned the knife. You
said a knife in the kitchen.
A. Yeah, but you got the evidence and the fingerprints, you
know. Before we started talkin' I said, no, I don't remember.
Q. But now you do. Do you remember now?
A. Yeah, I remember. 53
Thus, prior to this interrogation, there had been another, unre-
corded interrogation, during which interrogators apparently told
know her name." Geri Dreiling, Confession Transcript, RIVERFRONT TIMEs, July 2, 2003,
http://www.riverfronttimes.com/2003-07-02/news/confession-
transcript/bestof/2008/section/sports-and-recreation-29271. In our opinion, a possible
explanation for this is that sometimes interrogees who wish to please their interrogators
repeat details that interrogators have provided to them-however, due to the limits of hu-
man memory, their recollection is imprecise.
150. Allen, 684 S.W.2d at 424.
151. Id.
152. See Dreiling, supra note 149.
153. Id.
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Allen that they had other evidence against him. Research shows
that when interrogators lie to suspects, telling them that they have
solid evidence against them-particularly forensic evidence, such
as fingerprints, which is considered to be very reliable-there is a
high likelihood that this could lead to false confessions. This is so
either because the interrogee has become confused and believes
his interrogators or because he believes that he has no real chance
of being acquitted anyway.'"
VI. THE FALLACY OF THE TRANSPOSED CONDITIONAL
IN THE GEORGE ALLEN CASE
Allen was first linked to the Bell murder by the suspicion of pa-
trolmen who believed that he might be Kirk Eaton. That is to say,
his arrest and interrogation were the result of an error. If not for
his confession, every person in St. Louis-a big city with a large
population'55-could have been a suspect to the same extent. Geo-
graphical proximity was not even a factor, since, during the same
period, Allen lived in University City, about ten miles away from
Mary Bell's apartment in St. Louis.
Allen's case is similar to that of a defendant against whom there is
DNA evidence, which-even with a low probability of a random
match of 1/10,000-is still insufficient, on its own, to link him to the
crime. This is because there are many individuals in the populace
with an identical genetic profile. For every ten thousand people
there is, on average, one person with such a genetic profile. In a
population of hundreds of thousands, there would be dozens; in a
population of millions, hundreds. Moreover, there is the possibility
of a lab error, which is much more likely than the possibility of a
random match.15 6 In exactly the same manner, even if there is a low
probability that a confession with discernible signs of truth would
still be false, Allen's guilt is highly doubtful, since there was no other
154. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. Moreover, the confession transcript
shows that the interrogators' questions were very leading, and it gives the impression that
they basically "fed" Allen the details of his confession. See Dreiling, supra note 149. Many of
the details provided by Allen during his interrogation were incorrect and only after interro-
gators questioned him over and over, leading him on, did he hit on the correct details or
their approximation.
155. The population of St. Louis is about 350,000. The population of the Greater St.
Louis area, the location of both the scene of the murder and Allen's residence, is approxi-
mately 2,800,000. See St. Louis, Missouri, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
St._Louis,_Missouri (last visitedJan. 2, 2010).
156. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 4.8-4.9 (2009) [hereinafter FORENSIC SCIENCES COMMITTEE].
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evidence whatsoever against him. Also, as we will see below, the
probability of error when dealing with confessions is significantly
higher than the probability of error in DNA evidence.
The significance of doubt regarding the veracity of confes-
sions-even if only one out of a hundred confessions is false-is
that on every street where there are more than one hundred
adults, there would be (on average) at least one other adult who
would confess to the murder of Mary Bell if only he were interro-
gated under the same conditions as Allen. Even if we were to
assume that only one out of a thousand innocent interrogees
would falsely confess, still, in a population of hundreds of thou-
sands, we could expect hundreds of false confessions, while in a
population of millions we could expect thousands. And, as we will
see shortly, we estimate that at least one out of ten innocent inter-
rogees would give a false confession if they were all interrogated
under accepted conditions of police interrogation. The relevance
of the statistics of false confessions, in the case at hand, is that it
tells us that there are many other people who would have con-
fessed to the murder of Mary Bell if only they were interrogated
like Allen. How can we know that Allen's confession is in fact true
and not just one of those many false confessions that would have
been obtained if others were interrogated in the same fashion?
From the appellate decision in Allen's case, it is clear that the
judges were impressed by the fact that he seemingly provided de-
tails that only the murderer could have known and that the
investigators themselves were supposedly unaware of. This is why
they failed to ascribe any significance to other details in the confes-
sion that were inconsistent with the facts of the case. However, as
Garrett found in his study,'m' thirty-eight out of forty false confes-
sions that led to convictions, uncovered by the Innocence Project
through DNA post-conviction comparisons, were rich in detail.
Many of these false confessions were "contaminated" by details that
supposedly only the perpetrator could have known.
Just to make it simple and clear, we should note that the proba-
bility that Allen's detailed confession was false "competes" with
another, lower, probability, whereby it was just a coincidence that,
as a result of mistaken identification, the police picked up some-
one in the street and, wonder of wonders, it turned out that he was
actually the murderer. A probabilistic calculation shows that in an
overwhelming majority of these types of cases the confession is
false.
157. See Garrett, supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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From news reports of the case, it emerges that, in 2003, a DNA
test was performed on the semen traces found on Mary Bell's robe
and jeans.'" This test revealed that the semen belonged to Mary
Bell's boyfriend and not George Allen. 59 No traces of Allen's DNA
were found at the crime scene. 60 However, these findings were not
considered to be exculpatory evidence, as in other Innocence Pro-
ject cases, because they only proved that Mary Bell and her
boyfriend had sexual relations.'6
VII. APPLICATION OF BAYESIAN LOGIC TO CONFESSIONS-
FROM KEY EVIDENCE REQUIRING CORROBORATION
TO CORROBORATION FOR KEY EVIDENCE
We believe that the confession is always suspicious evidence, and
of questionable reliability. However, even those who disagree with
us, and view the confession as accurate evidence, must be very cau-
tious in a case like that of George Allen, when a conviction is based
solely on a confession, without any other significant inculpatory
evidence.
Moreover, the probabilistic calculation that we perform demon-
strates that it is not just when the confession is the sole evidence
that we need to be wary of the possibility that an innocent person
will be convicted. The proper weight of the confession is so low
that even strong corroboration is not necessarily sufficient in order
to achieve a secure conviction.
A. The Odds Form of Bayes' Theorem
Let us take a case in which a suspect is interrogated with regard
to a particular crirh'e and has confessed. In a probabilistic analysis,
we shall present this case as two hypotheses and one given event.'
The first hypothesis assumes the suspect's guilt (indicated by "G'),
158. Dreiling, supra note 118.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. At Allen's trial, the prosecution claimed that the semen on the victim's clothing
was Allen's, while the defense argued that it belonged to her boyfriend. About twenty years
later, it was revealed that the semen could not have been Allen's and that it was "consistent"
with the DNA of Bell's live-in boyfriend. As a result, the prosecution changed its version of
the crime, admitting that the semen came from consensual relations between the victim and
her boyfriend. Id.
162. For a similar analysis regarding the suggestibility of children, see StephenJ. Ceci &
Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 33 (2000).
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while the second hypothesis assumes the suspect's innocence (in-
dicated by "1"). The given event is the suspect's confession to the
crime during the interrogation (indicated by "E'-for "evidence").
Bayes' Theorem, presented in odds form, holds that:63
(1) Likelihood Ratio X Prior Odds = Posterior Odds.
The likelihood ratio is the probability ("P") that the interrogee
would confess given the fact that he is guilty divided by the proba-
bility that he would confess given the fact that he is innocent.
(2) likelihood ratio -P(EG)
P(E I)
This is the mathematical expression of the strength of the evi-
dence (in our case, the confession). For example, a likelihood
ratio of 10 means that the probability that a guilty interrogee
would confess is ten times greater than the probability that an in-
nocent interrogee would confess. However, the likelihood ratio, on
its own, is not a sufficient measure of the suspect's guilt or inno-
cence, since it does not take into account any other evidence apart
from the confession, but rather, assumes what actually needs to be
proven (the numerator of the likelihood ratio assumes guilt and
the denominator assumes innocence).
The prior odds are the probability of guilt divided by the proba-
bility of innocence, without taking the confession into
consideration, based on the other admissible evidence before the
court:164
(3) prior odds P(G)
P(I)
The product of the likelihood ratio multiplied by the prior odds
allows us to calculate what we are seeking in a criminal trial-the
posterior odds (posterior odds = likelihood ratio X prior odds).
This represents the weight of the confession together with the oth-
er evidence, defined as:
163. COLIN G.G. AITKEN & FRANCO TARONI, STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF Evi-
DENCE FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS 95 (2d ed. 2004); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 3, at 49;
William C. Thompson et al., How the Probability of a False Positive Affects the Value of DNA Evi-
dence, 48J. FORENSIC Sc. 47 (2003).
164. Thus, for instance, if a crime occurs on a deserted island (no one enters and no
one leaves) with a population of 100 people, each of whom is a suspect to the same extent,
then the prior odds of guilt would be 1/100 while the prior odds of innocence would be
99/100. The mathematical expression of the prior odds in such a case would be as follows:
P(G) 1/100
prior odds= P(G) =/100 = 0.0101
P(I) 99 /100
540 [ OL. 44:3
Proposal to Reverse the View of a Confession
(4) posterior odds -P(G E)
P(I E)
When the posterior odds yield a value of 1, the probability of
guilt given the confession is identical to the probability of inno-
cence given the confession. When these odds are greater than 1,
the probability of guilt is higher than the probability of innocence.
Therefore, the greater these odds, the stronger the proof of guilt.
When these odds are less than 1, the probability of innocence giv-
en (and despite) the confession is higher than the probability of
guilt. Therefore, the lower these odds, the higher the probability
of innocence.
In Bayesian language it is said that, to reach a verdict in a crimi-
nal trial, one must calculate the posterior odds of guilt. Bayes'
Theorem shows us the tremendous significance of the prior odds,
which are determined by evidence apart from the confession.
Thus, for example, when a person is interrogated without any solid
suspicion and, in the end, there is no other evidence against him
apart from his own confession, and, assuming that all other citizens
are just as likely to have committed the crime, then the prior odds
of guilt could be as low as one in a million. 6 5 To ignore such a low
probability is to ignore a sixth-order factor when calculating the
probability of guilt. To neglect such prior odds is an extreme form
of the fallacy of the transposed conditional.
B. The Likelihood Ratio of a Confession
How do we determine the likelihood ratio of a confession? As we
have seen, studies show that a phenomenon of false confessions
does exist: many interrogees actually confess to crimes that they
did not commit. It is reasonable to assume that the numerous cases
of false confessions that have been revealed may be just the tip of
the iceberg."' Unfortunately, there are no proven statistics for false
confessions. However, in an experiment examining the phenome-
non of academic cheating, 43% of those students subjected to a
165. R. v. Adams, (1996) 2 Crim. App. 467 (noting that the defense expert, Prof. Don-
nelly, estimated the prior odds that the defendant was the perpetrator to be approximately
1/3,600,000); see also R. v. Adams, (1998) 1 Crim. App. 377; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 3,
at 55 n.48.
166. GUDJONSSON, supra note 19, at 173; Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Social
Psychology of Police Interwgation: The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions, 16
STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y 189, 191 (1997).
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combination of interrogation methods signed false confessions.'
And, in a survey of 603 police interrogators in the United States,
these professionals held a belief that the rate of false confession
among innocent persons stood at 4.78 %.16 Similarly, in a study
conducted in Iceland, 12% of those prisoners interviewed reported
that they had confessed to crimes that they did not commit.6 9
Given these studies, given the false confessions that have been
revealed, and given the inherent effect of conditions of interroga-
tion (and detention) on suspects, we are willing to take a risk by
estimating that at least one out of every ten innocent interrogees
can be expected to give a false confession during a police interro-
gation. As we will see below, even based on much more optimistic
estimates, whereby the probability of a false confession is only one
out of a hundred or even one out of a thousand, there is still a
considerable danger of a wrongful conviction in cases where the
prior odds of guilt are low.
Are the courts able to identify these false confessions? As we have
seen in Part III above, studies show that the answer is negative.
It should be made clear that, while regarding forensic evidence,
such as DNA and fingerprints, the likelihood ratio should also re-
flect-along with the possibility of a random match-the possibility
of a laboratory testing error or an expert's mistake;o7 0 regarding
confessions, it is accepted that the court is essentially the expert.
Therefore, we must address the possibility of error on the part of
the court in determining the veracity of a confession."'
In our opinion, the likelihood ratio with regard to confessions is
influenced by both the possibility of a false confession as well as the
possibility of an error by the court in evaluating the veracity of a
confession. In order to illustrate this quantitatively, let us assume
that we have a proven statistic whereby the probability of a false
confession by an innocent person is one in ten. Let us further as-
sume that there is a 50% chance that the court will successfully
identify a false confession (in light of the research discussed above,
such as that of Leo and Ofshe (27%) and by Drizin and Leo
(14%), this is an optimistic, conservative estimate). Therefore, the
probability that a given confession is a false confession which will
not be discovered by the court is one out of twenty (0.05). This fig-
ure is placed in the denominator of the likelihood ratio. In order
167. See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
168. Kassin, supra note 26; text accompanying supra note 69.
169. GUDJONSSON, supra note 19, at 176.
170. FORENSIC SCIENCES CoMMIrEE, supra note 156; Sangero & Halpert, supra note 3,
at 73-78; Thompson et al., supra note 163, at 48-49.
171. See Sangero & Halpert, supra note 3, at 87-88.
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to determine the numerator of the likelihood ratio, we must calcu-
late the probability that a guilty person would confess. As we know,
the absence of a confession (a denial) is not considered evidence
of innocence, since guilty persons often deny their guilt. There-
fore, the probability that a guilty person would confess can be
assigned a value of no more than 0.5."' If we place this value into
the numerator of the likelihood ratio, we get:
(5) likelihood ratio P(EG) _ 0.5 10
P(E |I) 0.05
For the sake of those skeptics who believe that a confession is a
very reliable piece of evidence, we will return to these calculations
below, even for a likelihood ratio greater than 10.173
C. The Posterior Odds Necessary for a Criminal Conviction
How are we to determine the posterior odds necessary for a
criminal conviction? The accepted rule is that for the purposes of a
conviction we require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.174
The justification for this important rule is based on the gap in
power between the state and the defendant, on the need to bal-
ance the presentation of alleged guilt, on the principle protecting
the innocent and its reasoning, on the state's breach of the social
contract vis-a-vis innocent persons-and even the guilty when they
are convicted without a sufficient evidentiary basis-and on other
weighty considerations.
The proper definition of reasonable doubt is not quantitative,
but rather qualitative: if at the conclusion of a trial the trier of fact
is left with a doubt based on the evidentiary material, which the
prosecution has not succeeded to remove, then, even if the proba-
bility of innocence is very low, the defendant must be acquitted.' 6
Many find it hard to digest and apply this rule. Thus, there is a
tendency to try to quantify reasonable doubt in percentages. Given
the impossibility of reaching absolute certainty, guilt beyond a
172. Namely, the probability of a false negative for confessions is less than 50%.
173. And for the sake of those who are extremely skeptical, we will even deal with a like-
lihood ratio 100 times greater (a likelihood ratio of 1000).
174. PATRICKJ. FITZGERALD, CRIMINAL LAW AND PUNISHMENT 192 (1962); RonaldJ. Al-
len, The Restoration of in Re Winship: A Comment on Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases after
Patterson v. New York, 76 MICH. L. REv. 30, 37 (1977); Gerry Maher, The Verdict of the Jury, in
THEJURY UNDER ATTACK 40, 45 (Mark Findlay & Peter Duff eds., 1988).
175. See Rinat Kitai, Protecting the Guilty, 6 Bur. CRIM. L. REV. 1163 (2003).
176. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1894).
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reasonable doubt is assumed to be the highest standard of proof
that is realistic and within the bounds of human knowledge."' One
possible translation of this rule into percentages is a requirement
of a certainty of guilt approaching 99%.178
According to Blackstone's famous dictum, it is better that ten
criminals will be acquitted than that one innocent will be convicted;
for our purposes, it is possible (and common) to say that out of
eleven convictions we would tolerate, at most, one wrongful convic-
tion. Thus, a conviction is only justified on the basis of a probability
of guilt of 0= 90.91%.'
11
However, this threshold of 1:10 significantly detracts from the
certainty intended by the rule demanding proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. In 1923, Judge Learned Hand wrote:
Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused.
Our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the
innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need
to fear is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that
obstructs, delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime. 80
More recently, Justice Antonin Scalia expressed a certain degree
of skepticism with regard to the data yielded by a study of 340
wrongful convictions.'"' In doing so, he cited the opinion of District
Attorney Joshua Marquis, who argued that the percentage of
wrongful convictions in a worst-case scenario is only 0.027%:
[Llet's give the professor the benefit of the doubt: let's as-
sume that he understated the number of innocents by roughly
a factor of 10, that instead of 340 there were 4,000 people in
prison who weren't involved in the crime in any way. During
that same 15 years, there were more than 15 million felony
convictions across the country. That would make the error
177. Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive justice in the World ofJohn Mitch-
ell, 56 VA. L. REv. 371, 388 (1970); see also Kitai, supra note 175, at 1164.
178. See ALEx STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 16 (2005).
179. See Alexander Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 173, 174 (1997). Compare
the "Blackstone ratio" with Volokh's survey of possible thresholds, ranging from 1:1 to
1:5,000. Id. at 187-92. Thus, for example, Maimonides has written that "it is better and more
satisfactory to acquit a thousand guilty persons than to put a single innocent man to death."
2 MAIMONIDEs, SEFER HA'MITZVOT [BOOK OF COMMANDMENTS] 270 (Charles B. Chavel,
trans., Soncino Press 1984) (Negative Commandment 290). And for another discussion
regarding this threshold, see Ceci & Friedman, supra note 162, at 76-80.
180. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 636, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
181. Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 197-98 (2006) (Scalia,J., concurring).
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rate .027 percent-or, to put it another way, a success rate of
99.973 percent. 2
A survey conducted in the United States found that greater than
70% of criminal justice officials questioned believed that wrongful
convictions are rare occurrences-less than 1% of all cases.I" In
England, as well, many believed that wrongful convictions are very
rare, but this view has changed.184
Therefore, the legal system ascribes a high degree of reliability
to a legal approach based on reasonable doubt-i.e., an ultimate
rate of wrongful convictions lower than 0.027%. This view grants
almost absolute certainty to the reasonable doubt rule.
At the same time, American law easily adopts Blackstone's
threshold of 1:10-which means a burden of proof of about
90.91% (10/11) certainty. And, indeed, in a survey conducted
among 171 judges, it emerged that the most frequent choice was a
threshold of proof of 90%, chosen by fifty-six judges, with forty-five
judges understanding the reasonable doubt rule as a level of proof
of less than 90% certainty, while seventy judges felt that it was
greater than 90% (the average choice was 90.3% and the median
was 90%).
However, this accepted adoption of Blackstone's threshold could
lead to results significantly different from the optimistic expecta-
tions regarding the nearly absolute reliability of the reasonable
doubt threshold. In 2008, there were 2,310,984 inmates in U.S.
prisons. 86 Such a threshold of 1:10 means that we are supposedly
willing to tolerate a situation in which 9.1% of these 2,310,984 in-
mates, namely, 210,089 prisoners, are innocent.
However, the calculation should be slightly refined and made
more precise: within the group of inmates, there are those whose
probability of guilt, arising from the evidence adduced at trial, is
182. Joshua Marquis, Op-Ed., The Innocent and the Shammed, N.Y. TIMEs,Jan. 26, 2006, at
A23, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/26/opinion/26marquis.html?_r=1.
183. C. Ronald Huff, Arye Rattner & Edward Sagarin, Guilty Until Proved Innocent: Wrong-
Jul Conviction and Public Policy, 32 CRIME & DEUNQ. 518, 522-523 (1986).
184. JUSTICE IN ERROR 16 (Clive Walker & Keir Starmer eds., 1993).
185. C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof. Degrees of Belief Quanta of Evidence, or Constitu-
tional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1293, 1324-27 (1982). Fifty-six judges chose a threshold
of 90%, twenty chose 85%, fourteen chose 80%, eight chose 75% and another three judges
were willing to suffice with a lower threshold. Id. at 1325. Three judges chose between 92-
94%, thirty-one quantified the threshold as 95%, one judge chose 97%, six chose 98%, eight
chose 99%, and twenty-one judges felt that the threshold is 100%. Id. For a review of addi-
tional surveys with similar results, see Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in
Criminal Cases: Some Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 'Rx. L. REv. 105, 125-29 (1999).
186. Stacy A. Hickox, Justifying Rejection of Applicants with Convictions, 8 DARTMOUTH L.J.
39, 43 (2010).
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higher than the minimum threshold for a conviction, which-
according to Blackstone's formulation-is 90.9%. Let us assume
that the probability of guilt derived from the evidence against all
2,310,984 inmates is uniformly distributed, 1 7 from a threshold of
90.9% up to a maximum of 100%. That is to say, at each threshold
there will be an identical number of cases. This makes it possible to
calculate that 4.54% of the 2,310,984 inmates-namely, 105,044-
are actually innocent!1" Intuitively, this may also be presented as
follows: the average conviction would have an average certainty of
95.45%-which is between the chosen threshold of 90.9% and
100%. According to Joshua Marquis's figure of 15 million convic-
tions in fifteen years," we would be talking about 681,181 false
convictions.
Therefore, a serious logical contradiction exists between the
supposed willingness to set the minimum threshold of reasonable
doubt at 1:10, which predicts 681,181 wrongful convictions over a
period of fifteen years, and the optimistic belief that during these
fifteen years "only" 4,000 false convictions have occurred. A simple
calculation demonstrates that in order to limit the number of
wrongful convictions to only 4,000 out of a total of 15 million con-
victions requires a reasonable doubt threshold of 1:1,874-i.e., a
rule whereby it is better to set 1,874 criminals free in order to avoid
one wrongful conviction."
187. For such an assumption, see David Hamer, Probabilistic Standards of Proof Their Com-
plements, and the Errors that Are Expected to Flow from Them, 1 U. NEW ENG. L.J. 71, 90 (2004).
188. If we use NFCto signify the number of false convictions, Nto signify all of the cases
in which defendants are convicted (N=2,310,984), p to signify the probability of guilt deriv-
ing from the overall evidence presented at trial against a given defendant (which varies from
case to case), T to signify the minimum threshold for a conviction (T=10/11=90.9%), and
assuming that the probability of guilt arising from the evidence is uniformly distributed,
then we would get:
NFC = Nx - x (1 - p)dp
1-T
Performing the integration would lead to the following result:
NFC = Nx (1 - T)
2
When discussing a uniform distribution, it is easy to see (intuitively) the logic in the result: in
order to calculate the number of false convictions, we need to multiply Nby the average probabil-
ity of guilt ( T) between the chosen threshold Tand 1 (the equivalent of 100% certainty).
2
Inserting the numbers will produce:
NFC = -N = 0.0454N = 105044
242
The rate of false convictions would be 4.54%.
See id. at 89-96.
189. Marquis, supra note 182, quoted in Marsh, 548 U.S. at 197-98.
190. This result is obtained when NFC (number of false convictions), supra note 188, is de-
fined as a constant and T (the threshold) is defined as a variable that must be calculated.
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Moreover, in our opinion, there is no basis whatsoever for Mar-
quis's choice of a factor of 10 as a multiple for these 340 cases. This
is because these are 340 cases that a few professors -with their
naturally limited powers-have succeeded to identify, and they on-
ly constitute the tip of the iceberg regarding the overall
phenomenon. As the authors of the research wrote: "it is certain-
this is the clearest implication of our study-that many defendants
who are not on this list, no doubt thousands, have been falsely
convicted of serious crimes but have not been exonerated."191
Recently, Michael Risinger has examined the percentage of
wrongful convictions in a more precise fashion than Marquis." His
analysis of Innocence Project data reveals a minimum factually
wrongful conviction rate of 3.3% for capital rape-murder in the
1980s, and a "fairly generous likely maximum of 5% ."1 These re-
sults totally disprove the Supreme Court's optimistic attitude, even
regarding offenses that might carry the death penalty. However,
there is no reason to believe that the numbers are lower for other
offenses. Therefore, we do not share the optimistic view that it is
possible to convict with a relatively low probability of guilt of 90%
without paying a heavy price in wrongful convictions.
For the purpose of our Bayesian calculation, we would not go so
far as a threshold of 1874, and not even a threshold of 1000, as
proposed by Maimonides.' 4 Instead, we shall adopt the ideological
determination of Thomas Starkie, whereby it is better to acquit one
hundred criminals than to convict one innocent; 1' namely, out of
Removing T from the equation linking NFC to T, provided in supra note 188, results in the
following:
2 x NFC
T=1- 1- 2x FCR
N
When the FCR (false conviction rate) appearing to the right of the value for Tis defined as
NFC
FCR -- in the example provided by the Supreme Court, its value would be:
N
4,000
FCR ,000 = 0.027%
15,000,000




In terms of posterior odds, this is equivalent to an extremely high threshold of 1,874.
191. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 527 (2005).
192. D. Michael Risinger, Innocents Convicted: An Empirically Justied Factual Wrongful
Conviction Rate, 97J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 762 (2007).
193. Id. at 780.
194. See supra note 179.
195. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (quoting T. STARKIE, EVIDENCE 756
(1824) ("The maxim of the law is ... that it is better that ninety-nine ... offenders should
escape, than that one innocent man should be condemned")); see also United States v. Cole,
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101 convictions we would tolerate, at most, one false conviction. In
other words, it is justifiable to convict only on the basis of posterior
odds of at least 100, or a probability of guilt of 0 = 99.1%.
101
However, as we will see below, even someone who chooses a low-
er threshold of proof, such as 90%, will find that a confession is not
evidence with the potential to prove guilt in accordance with this
threshold.
D. The Prior Odds Necessary for a Conviction Based on a Confession
In the previous sections we have established a likelihood ratio of
10 for confession evidence and have proposed the choice of a min-
imum threshold of 100 for posterior odds, while we are aware of
the fact that American law, apparently, accepts a threshold of 10. It
remains for us to determine what prior odds are required in order
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. When we insert the rele-
vant numbers into Equation (1), the prior odds necessary to
convict based on a confession must be at least 10:
posterior odds 100
(6) prior odds likelihood ratio 10
Therefore, we must demand that:
(7) prior odds P(G) 10 - P(G) 1Ox P(I)
P(I)
To put it in words: the probability of guilt without a confession,
derived from the remaining evidence, must be at least 91% in or-
der to achieve proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (a
posterior odds threshold of 100) based on a confession.
Therefore, the conclusion that will certainly surprise many read-
ers is that it is more correct to treat a confession as corroboration
for other solid evidence-if it exists-and to no longer view it as
the key evidence for a conviction that only lacks corroboration.
25 F. Cas. 493, 509 (D. Ohio 1853) ("For it is better, far better, that ninety-nine guilty per-
sons should escape human punishment, than that one innocent person should suffer it.");
Finchim v. Commonwealth, 3 S.E. 343, 344-45 (Va. 1887) ("We have accordingly given to the
case, and to the arguments of counsel, the most careful consideration; mindful all the time
that it were better, in the eye of the law, that ninety-nine guilty men should go unpunished,
than that one innocent man should be condemned."); Ceci & Friedman, supra note 162, at
76-80; Volokh, supra note 179.
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This requires a significant reversal in the accepted view of the role
of the confession in criminal law.
Even if we assume that a confession is much more precise evi-
dence and that only one out of a hundred cases in which an
innocent person is interrogated will yield a false confession, the
likelihood ratio in Equation (5) should increase from 10 to 100. In
such a case, the prior odds in Equation (6) must be greater than 1:
posterior odds 100
(10) prior odds = otro odd 100
likelihoodratio 100
That is to say:
(11) prior odds = P(G) >1 => P(G) P(I)
P(I)
In other words, even if we assume that a confession is ten times
more precise than we have estimated, then, in order to achieve a
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt we must still demand that
the probability of guilt without the confession is greater than the
probability of innocence.
The following table illustrates the significance of a conviction
under various conditions and with different figures:
Prior Odds Likelihood Ratio Posterior Odds Probability of Guilt
(based on the remaining (strength of confession (the final conclusion) (in percentages)
evidence, apart from the evidence)
confession)
1/1 ("50:50") 10 10/1 (1 out of every 11 91%
such convictions is
wrongful)
1/10 10 1/1 (1 out of every 2 such 50%
convictions is wrongful)
1/100 10 1/10 (10 out of every 11 9%
such convictions are
wrongful)
1/1000 10 1/100 (100 out of every 0.99%
101 such convictions are
wrongful)
1/10,000 10 1/1000 (1000 out of every 0.099%
1001 such convictions are
wrongful)
1/10,000 100 (assuming the 1/100 (100 out of every 0.99%
confession to be 10 times 101 such convictions are
stronger than our wrongful)
estimate)
1/10,000 1000 (assuming the
confession to be 100
times stronger than our
estimate)
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The first five lines of the above table illustrate various prior odds
for a likelihood ratio of 10 (which reflects, in our estimation, the
realistic power of the confession as proof of guilt). The first line
represents a case in which, without the confession, the probability
of guilt (the prior odds, based on the other evidence) is 50%. That
is to say, there is other, significant evidence against the defendant.
In such a case, the posterior odds (the final conclusion) are 1:10,
or, in other words, out of eleven convictions, one is a wrongful
conviction. This is an illustration of the choice of a threshold de-
rived from Blackstone's approach. This means that, even at such a
relatively low, dangerous threshold, the extent of evidence without
the confession still must be at least a balance of probabilities in or-
der to convict-a far cry from the case of George Allen, where his
probability of guilt without the confession was very low. When the
prior odds are one in ten thousand, then the (final) probability of
guilt is less than 0.1%, while the probability of innocence is greater
than 99.9%.
For those who believe the confession to be much more precise
evidence than our estimate (a likelihood ratio of 10), we have add-
ed to the table the possibility of a likelihood ratio of 100, and the
imaginary possibility of a likelihood ratio of 1000. And, even under
such assumptions, when the prior odds are as low as one in ten
thousand (i.e., there is no other significant evidence against the
defendant apart from the confession), the probability of guilt is
only 1% and 9% (respectively)-such that the prosecution would
not even be able to prevail in a civil trial, based on a preponder-
ance of the evidence. Moreover, even those who believe a
threshold of 90.91% to be sufficient (derived from Blackstone's
dictum) would not reach a conclusion of guilt.
VIII. POSSIBLE CRITIQUES OF THE PROBABILISTIC
ANALYSIS OF A CONFESSION
Various critiques of our proposition and the basis for it will likely
be advanced. We have anticipated these and provide responses to
them. One possible critique is the argument that a confession is
not statistical evidence and, therefore, not conducive to the proba-
bilistic analysis that we are conducting through the use of Bayes'
Theorem. Since the probability of false confession is not insignifi-
cant, it is necessary to determine what we can learn from
probability theory in assessing the proper weight of the confes-
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sion.' 6 In Supreme Court judgments, the approach that has taken
shape negates the metaphysical certainty of a legal decision and
views error as an occurrence with a probability greater than zero.9
Since all evidence is probabilistic, including the confession, a reli-
ance on probabilistic logic, particularly Bayesian logic, could help
us considerably to reach legal decisions while avoiding cognitive
illusions. 98
A second possible critique would be that the statistics of false
confession (even if such statistics were reliable) are irrelevant to an
examination of the veracity of a confession in a given case. Accord-
ing to this argument, the relevant question is whether or not the
specific confession is false, and not the percentage of false confes-
sions in other cases. In a given case, the trier of fact can determine
whether the confession is true in isolation from the remaining
evidence or despite its absence. This is accomplished through an
impression of the confession, the interrogation tapes, the de-
fendant's testimony, his tone of voice, his body language, the
cross-examination of his interrogators regarding any illegitimate
pressure that might have been exerted, and other "signs of truth"
regarding the confession.
This argument is similar in nature to the "case specific" argu-
ment regarding DNA evidence, which states that the statistics of lab
error are unimportant when trying to determine the possibility of
error in a given case, since the trier of fact is able to examine the
conduct of the laboratory that performed the test and to decide
196. Bayesian analyses of other, non-forensic evidence also exists in legal literature.
Thus, for example, a Bayesian analysis of the incriminating testimony of children with re-
gard to sexual exploitation has appeared in the Cornell Law Review. See Ceci & Friedman,
supra note 162, at 80-89; see also Sangero & Halpert, supra note 3.
197. See Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S 1, 14 (1994) ("But the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard is itself probabilistic."); see also United States v. Veysey, 334 F.3d 600, 606 (7th Cir.
2003) ("Statistical evidence is merely probabilistic evidence coded in numbers rather than
words."); Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 698 (7th Cir. 1987) ("All evidence is probabil-
istic-statistical evidence merely explicitly so."). This view has also been expressed in legal
literature. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law ofEvidence, 51 STAN. L.
REv. 1477, 1508 (1999) ("It is now generally recognized, even by the judiciary, that since all
evidence is probabilistic-there are no metaphysical certainties-evidence should not be
excluded merely because its accuracy can be expressed in explicitly probabilistic
terms. . . .").
198. Despite the fact that, in his article, Posner does not propose that Bayes' Theorem
be introduced into the law, he does view it as a guide for decision-making in conditions of
uncertainty: "The process by which evidence is obtained, presented, and evaluated in a trial
can be fruitfully modeled in economic terms, using either a search model or a
cost-minimization model and incorporating Bayes' theorem as a guide to rational decision making
under uncertainty." Posner, supra note 197, at 1542 (emphasis added).
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whether a lab error actually occurred even when there is no addi-
tional evidence against the defendant.H
There are several good arguments to refute this claim. First of
all, the statistics of false confession are relevant to a given case be-
cause it tells us how many other possible suspects would have
confessed if only they were interrogated in said case. As we have
seen, the set of evidence in the rape of the Central Park jogger,"
considered persuasive enough to convict five youths beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, lost its credibility in favor of more convincing
evidence against a different suspect-Matias Reyes. Similarly, if the
trier of fact was faced with not just two sets of evidence, each of
which, on its own, could have led to the conviction of a different
defendant, as in the case of the Central Park jogger, but instead
with 10 or 100 or even 10,000 sets of evidence, each of which, on its
own, could, under the present legal situation-in which the con-
fession is considered to be key evidence-have been sufficient for
the conviction of a defendant, then no one would argue that the
trier of fact is able to determine whether, in a given case, the con-
fession is true. In such a case, in order to distinguish between the
competing confessions, the trier of fact would have to demand in-
dependent, strong corroboration, extraneous to the defendant,
connecting the defendant to the commission of the crime. The
trier of fact could not pretend that he is able to choose the true
confession, from among the many false confessions that might be
expected according to the general statistics of false confession,
solely based on the specific characteristics of the case at hand.
There is only one reason why the confession of just one defendant
is before the trier of fact, and not these other sets of evidence: the
police do not interrogate (and are not supposed to interrogate) all
members of the population in an attempt to elicit confessions.
Secondly, normative theories of prediction state that in order to
determine the occurrence of error in key evidence it is necessary to
address the overall evidence in the case, which in Bayesian lan-
guage is referred to as the prior odds. On this subject, Nobel
laureate Daniel Kahaneman and his research colleague, Amos
Tversky, have written that "[t] he failure to appreciate the relevance
of prior probability in the presence of specific evidence is perhaps
199. "The question to be decided is not the general error rate for a laboratory or labor-
atones over time but rather whether the laboratory doing DNA testing in this particular case
made a critical error." NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA
EVIDENCE 85 (1996); see alsoJonathanJ. Koehler, Why DNA Likelihood Ratios Should Accountfor
Error (Even When a National Research Council Report Says They Should Not), 37 JURIMETRICS J.
425, 431 (1997); Sangero & Halpert, supra note 3, at 56-59.
200. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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one of the most significant departures of intuition from the nor-
mative theory of prediction."201
As we have seen,202 there are cases in which low prior odds could
reduce the certainty in a conviction based on a confession by sev-
eral orders of magnitude. Ignoring such low prior odds is an
extreme form of the fallacy of the transposed conditional. This is
so even if the impression of a particular confession (without any
other external evidence), derived from elements such as the inter-
rogation tapes and the defendant's testimony in court 20 support
the belief that the confession is true.20' The lower the prior odds
derived from the remaining facts of the case, the greater the prob-
ability that the defendant is innocent and that an error has
occurred. In other words, the greater the doubt regarding the de-
fendant's guilt, isolated from the confession, the greater the
probability that this is actually a false confession.
Moreover, the corroboration for a confession must be so strong
that not only will it distinguish the person who has confessed from
those same ten thousand people who would have confessed had
they been interrogated, but it must also establish the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This corroboration must reduce
the probability of innocence given (and despite) the confession,
which, in some cases is greater than 99.99%, to less than 1% (since
201. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REV.
237, 243 (1973).
202. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
203. Characteristics which, in our estimation, may be found in every single case if only
one wishes to find them.
204. See the instructive explanation by Jonathan J. Koehler, who criticizes the view that
lab error statistics in the field of DNA testing are irrelevant for a determination as to wheth-
er an actual error occurred in the case at hand:
By this reasoning, one should predict that nearly all newly married couples will stay
married, that most major-college football players will play professional football, and
that most law professors who submit articles to the Harvard Law Review can expect an
acceptance letter. Why? Because, in each case, it is easy to identify a host of individu-
ating features that support the favorable outcome. The Jones newlyweds love each
other deeply, Smith the college football player has an influential agent, and Taylor
the law professor is working in a hot area of the law.
But depressing base-rate frequency statistics tell us that 50% of marriages end in di-
vorce, 99% of major college football players do not make it into professional football,
and more than 99% of articles submitted to the Harvard Law Review are rejected.
Surely a person who takes these base-rate statistics into account will make more accu-
rate judgments than a person who relies solely on a select sample of individuating
information that is consistent with the favorable outcome.
Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Prbative Value of DNA Evidence: Frequencies, Likelihood
Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. COLo. L. REv. 859, 873 (1996).
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it is better that a hundred criminals go free than for one innocent
to be convicted); or-according to a different view, which we do
not share-to less than 10% (in accordance with Blackstone's ra-
tio). This corroboration should be very strong. It is highly doubtful
that it is proper to continue referring to it as "corroboration": giv-
en the very limited weight of the confession, it seems that the key
evidence necessary for a conviction is lacking.
This might be the place to stress that we are not suggesting that
the trier of fact must calculate probabilities and reach a decision
based on such calculations. In our opinion, the possibility of error
that exists for all evidence, whether this is a lab error in DNA test-
ing or a false confession, leads to a reasonable doubt that the
prosecution must overcome by means of other evidence. This is so
regardless of the quantification of this probability. However, with-
out the formal-mathematical description and without an
understanding of the importance of prior odds, even evidence with
a low probability of error (such as DNA or fingerprints) could, in
certain cases, appear much stronger than it actually is. This is the




In this Article, we have illustrated the danger of wrongful convic-
tions resulting from false confessions. Given the fact that the
probability of a false confession is not insignificant, we have shown
the importance of an awareness of the fallacy of the transposed
conditional. The probabilistic analysis that we have conducted
shows that there is a need to alter the perception of the confession:
a confession should no longer be viewed as key evidence capable of
supporting a conviction, which only require some sort of corrobo-
ration. Instead, a confession must be viewed solely as corroboration
for other key evidence, if it exists.
We have demonstrated this through the case of George Allen.
The prior odds of George Allen's guilt were very low. Without his
confession, there was no significant evidence linking him to the
rape or the murder of the victim and every other person in the
same city was suspect to the same degree. In such a situation, in
order to overcome such low prior odds of guilt,206 it was neces-
205. This is also the case with eyewitness testimony. See Sangero 8& Halpert, supra note 3,
at 90-94.
206. See supra table in Part VII.D.
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sary-based on the laws of probability-for the key evidence (in
this case, the confession) to be more reliable. The research in this
field leads to the conclusion that confessions are very far from be-
ing sufficiently reliable for this purpose.
We have also shown that the legal system's expectations regard-
ing the reasonable doubt threshold-a (supposedly) negligible
number of false convictions-are inconsistent with the willingness
to choose a threshold of guilt sufficient for a conviction such as
that implied by Blackstone's approach (1:10). Therefore, we prefer
the higher threshold proposed by Starkie (1:100). Based on this
threshold, we have shown that there is a need to alter the percep-
tion of the confession: a confession should no longer be
considered to be key evidence, but only corroboration for other
key evidence. This conclusion is also valid for the lower conviction
threshold derived from Blackstone's ratio. When the prior odds of
guilt (based on the other evidence, apart from the confession) are
low, then the posterior odds of guilt (calculated by the overall
facts) are also low. The laws of probability teach us that there is a
very high probability that the defendant is innocent. That is to say,
in cases like George Allen's, where the confession is the only evi-
dence of the defendant's guilt, a trial ending in a conviction is
likely a wrongful conviction. Unfortunately, this matter was not
properly addressed in the judgments sentencing George Allen to
life imprisonment, and it is not properly addressed in many other
similar cases.
The court of appeals held that, since there was probable cause
for George Allen's arrest, the confession should not be viewed as
the illegitimate fruit of an illegal arrest. We believe that the legisla-
ture should require that the interrogation of a suspect is
conditional on the existence of a strong, well-established suspicion
against him regarding the crime for which he is being interrogat-
ed, regardless of whether or not the Miranda rule has been
followed. In our opinion, the police should not be allowed to con-
duct fishing expeditions in an attempt to elicit confessions from
"suspects." The results of such interrogations, which are not ac-
companied by key, extraneous evidence, are simply unreliable.
Similarly, given the limited reliability of eyewitness testimony, there
is a reform proposal, which also makes use of a Bayesian calcula-
tion, to not conduct a lineup when there is no reasonable
suspicion against a person that he is the perpetrator.2 o
In the Middle Ages, when confessions were elicited through tor-
ture, it was recognized that the confession alone did not carry
207. Gary Wells, Eyewitness Identification: Systemic Reforms, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 615, 635-40.
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much weight and, therefore, probable cause was required as a pre-
condition for interrogations by torture. In fact, a rule was even
established disqualifying confessions obtained without such proba-
ble cause.208 It seems that we have taken a step backwards at this
point; it is time to take a step forward and permit confessions to be
viewed solely as corroboration for other key evidence.
208. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE: ENGLAND, GERMA-
NY, FRANCE 179-88 (1974). For an approach whereby the detention of modern times has
replaced the torture of the Middle Ages, see Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Detention for the Purpose of
Interrogation as Modem "Torture", 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 137 (2008).
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